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Comment of Financial Regulation and Consumer Protection Scholars 
on Docket No. CFPB-2018-0012 
 
 
June 25, 2018 
 
Comment Intake 
Consumer Financial Protection Bureau 
1700 G Street, N.W. 
Washington, D.C.  20552 
 
Dear Sir or Madam:   
 
Please see the submission below in response to the Consumer Financial Protection 
Bureau’s Request for Information (RFI) Regarding the Bureau’s Inherited Regulations and 
Inherited Rulemaking Authorities (Docket No. CFPB-2018-0012).  We are concerned 
scholars and former regulators, including scholars specializing in financial regulation, 
consumer financial law, and administrative law.*   
 
This comment builds on our prior comments on the Bureau’s RFIs Regarding General 
Rulemaking Processes (Docket No. CFPB-2018-009) and Adopted Regulations and New 
Rulemaking Authorities (Docket No. CFPB-2018-0011).  The three should be read 
together.  
 
Thank you for the opportunity to submit this comment for your consideration.  
 
Kathleen C. Engel, Research 
Research Professor of Law 
Suffolk University Law School 
 
 
 
 
 
William Black 
Associate Professor of Economics and Law, University of Missouri-Kansas City 
 
Susan Block-Lieb 
Cooper Family Chair in Urban Legal Studies , Fordham University, School of Law 
 
Amy Boss  
Trustee Professor of Law, Drexel University School of Law 
 
                                                
*  Affiliations of signatories are for identification only and do not represent the views of the various 
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Mark Budnitz  
Professor of Law Emeritus, Georgia State University College of Law 
 
Stephen Calkins  
Professor, Wayne State University Law School 
 
Prentiss Cox 
Associate Professor of Law, University of Minnesota Law School 
 
Kathleen Engel  
Research Professor of Law, Suffolk University Law School 
 
Linda Fisher  
Professor of Law, Seton Hall Law School 
 
Pamela Foohey 
Associate Professor, Indiana University Maurer School of Law 
 
Judith Fox  
Clinical Professor, Notre Dame Law School 
 
Sally Frank  
Professor of Law, Drake University 
 
Anna Gelpern  
Professor of Law, Georgetown 
 
Jeffrey Gentes  
Visiting Clinical Lecturer and Supervising Attorney, Yale Law School 
 
Sara Greene 
Associate Professor of Law, Duke Law School 
 
Edward Janger 
David M. Barse Professor, Brooklyn Law School 
 
Dalie Jimenez 
Professor of Law, UC Irvine College of Law 
 
Kathleen Keest 
Formerly Office of the Iowa Attorney General, inter alia (retired) 
 
Peter Kochenburger  
Associate Clinical Professor of Law, Deputy Director, Insurance Law Center, University 
of Connecticut School of Law 
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Lea Krivinskas Shepard  
Associate Professor, Loyola University Chicago School of Law 
 
Adam Levitin  
Agnes N. Williams Research Professor and Professor of Law, Georgetown University 
Law Center 
 
Cathy Lesser Mansfield  
Professor of Law, Drake University Law School 
 
Scott Maurer  
Associate Clinical Professor, Santa Clara Law 
 
Patricia McCoy 
Professor of Law, Boston College Law School  
 
Christopher Odinet  
Horatio C. Thompson Assistant Professor of Law, Southern University Law Center 
 
Dee Pridgen 
Carl M. Williams Professor of Law and Social Responsibility, University of Wyoming 
College of Law 
 
David Reiss 
Professor of Law, Brooklyn Law School 
 
Florence Roisman 
William F. Harvey Professor of Law and Chancellor's Professor, Indiana University 
Robert H. McKinney School of Law 
 
Jon Romberg  
Associate Professor, Seton Hall University School of Law 
 
Jacob Hale Russell 
Assistant Professor, Rutgers University School of Law 
 
Ellen Seidman  
Former Director, Office of Thrift Supervision 
 
Ann Shalleck 
Professor of Law and Carrington Shields Scholar, American University, Washington 
College of Law 
 
Norman I. Silber 
Professor of Law/Senior Research Scholar, Hofstra Law School/Yale Law School 
 
 4 
Neil Sobol 
Professor, Texas A&M University School of Law 
 
Jeff Sovern 
Professor of Law, St. John's University School of Law 
 
Gregory Squires 
Professor of Sociology, Public Policy & Public Administration, George Washington 
University 
 
Mark Steiner 
Professor of Law, South Texas College of Law 
 
Corey Stone 
Senior Advisor, Oliver Wyman 
 
Karen Tokadz  
Professor of Law, Washington University in St. Louis 
 
Theresa Verges 
Director, Investors’ Rights Clinic, Rutgers University School of Law 
 
Lauren Willis  
Professor of Law, Loyola Law School, Los Angeles 
 
Catherine Lee Wilson  
Associate Professor, University of Nebraska-Lincoln College of Law  
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
 
The CFPB is Using RFIs for Sham Purposes 
 
• The CFPB has revealed that its stated reason for its many RFIs is not the real 
reason. The stated reason is “to seek public input” on the various RFI topics 
that the Bureau planned to evaluate. Instead, the CFPB is using the RFI 
responses as “cover” for various policy changes, when, in fact, the responses 
do not support such changes. 
 
 
This RFI impedes public input by being impossibly vague and broad 
 
• This RFI seeks input on twenty different sets of unrelated regulations and all their 
component parts.  Nowhere did the CFPB specify which provisions it is 
considering changing. Likewise, it failed to ask specific questions that would 
enable meaningful responses. The Acting Director, by conducting closed-door 
meetings with industry, has privileged the financial services industry and left 
consumers in the dark about the changes industry wants and that the CFPB is 
considering.  
 
 
The CFPB is Disguising what Should have been Notice and Comment Rulemaking as 
Requests for Information  
  
• The CFPB has stated that the rule-related RFIs are for the purpose of obtaining 
information on desired changes to existing rules and recommendations for new 
rules. This type of inquiry falls under the Administrative Procedure Act, which 
requires very specific steps in the “process for formulating, amending, or 
repealing a rule.”1 
 
 
If the CFPB’s Illegitimate RFI Process is Successful, the Financial Security of 
Consumers, Hardworking American Families, and Financial Markets will be in Jeopardy   
 
• If the CFPB’s illegitimate RFI process is successful, the financial security of 
consumers, hardworking American families, and financial markets will be in 
jeopardy.   
 
 
 
 
                                                
1 5 U.S.C.A. 551(5). 
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Comment of Financial Regulation and Consumer Protection Scholars 
on Docket No. CFPB-2018-0012 
 
The Request for Information (RFI) by the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau 
(“CFPB” or “Bureau”) Regarding the Bureau’s Inherited Regulations and Inherited 
Rulemaking Authorities asks whether the Bureau should make any changes to existing 
inherited regulations or add any new regulations.2 
 
I. Description of  “Inherited Regulations” and Incorporation of Prior Responses 
 
This RFI is one of three CFPB RFIs on rulemaking.  Previously, the Bureau issued an 
RFI on its rulemaking processes.3 We filed a separate comment on that RFI.4  The second 
RFI was on Adopted Regulations.5 We also submitted a comment on that RFI.6 The 
Inherited Regulations RFI is the final rule-related RFI. Our response to this RFI should 
be read together with the previous two responses. 
 
Inherited Regulations are “the various regulations that” other federal agencies issued 
before the Dodd-Frank Act transferred their consumer-related rulemaking authority to the 
CFPB.7  In circumstances where the Bureau amended an Inherited Regulation, it 
classifies that rule as an Adopted Regulation.8 Inherited Regulations include: 
 
o Truth in Lending Regulation Z 
o Homeownership Equity Protection Act 
o Credit Card Act of 2009 
o SAFE Mortgage Licensing Act 
o Fair Debt Collection Practices Act 
o Federal Trade Commission Act 
o Fair Credit Reporting Act 
                                                
2  Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, Request for Information Regarding the Bureau’s Inherited 
Regulations and Inherited Rulemaking Authorities, 83 Fed. Reg. 12,881 (March 26, 2018) [hereinafter 
Inherited Regulations RFI]. 
3  Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, Request for Information Regarding Bureau Rulemaking 
Processes, 83 Fed. Reg. 10,437 (March 9, 2018). 
4  Comment of Financial Regulation and Consumer Protection Scholars and Former Regulators on 
Docket No. CFPB-2018-0009 (June 7, 2018) (available at https://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/cfpb-
comments/6/). 
5  Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, Request for Information Regarding the Bureau’s Adopted 
Regulations and New Rulemaking Authorities, 83 Fed. Reg. 12,286 (March 21, 2018) [hereinafter Adopted 
Regulations RFI]. 
6  Comment of Financial Regulation and Consumer Protection Scholars and Former Regulators on 
Docket No. CFPB-2018-0011 (June 19, 2018). 
7  Adopted Regulations RFI, supra note 5, at 12,287. 
8  Id. 
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o Gramm–Leach–Bliley Act 
o Consumer Leasing Act 
o Real Estate Settlement Practices Act 
o Equal Credit Opportunity Act 
o Home Mortgage Data Act 
o Electronic Funds Transfer Act 
o Interstate Land Sales Full Disclosure Act 
o Truth in Savings Act 
o Fair Credit Billing Act 
o Homeowners Protection Act 
o Alternative Mortgage Transaction Parity Act 
o Expedited Funds Availability Act 
o 12 U.S. Code § 1831t - Depository Institutions Lacking Federal Deposit 
Insurance 
 
II. The CFPB is Using RFIs for Sham Purposes 
 
The CFPB has revealed that its stated reason for its many RFIs is not the real reason. The 
stated reason is “to seek public input” on the various RFI topics that the Bureau planned 
to tevaluate.9  Instead, the CFPB is using the RFI responses as “cover” for various policy 
changes, when, in fact, the responses do not support such changes.  
 
The RFI process is important for all stakeholders because it enables them to share their 
experiences, insights, and concerns about the CFPB and the rules and policies it adopts. 
For the CFPB, the RFI responses can be used to justify its actions. The importance of the 
RFIs cannot be overstated and, for this reason, the CFPB must act with integrity in 
requesting, evaluating and relying on responses to RFIs. 
 
To our consternation, the CFPB leadership’s RFI process is a sham A few days after the 
deadline for RFI responses on external engagements closed, the CFPB announced that it 
was canceling all future meetings of all its advisory boards, having previously canceled 
every meeting since Mr. Mulvaney took office. The CFPB informed the advisory board 
members in two phone calls on June 6, 2018. In justifying the cancellations and 
effectively terminating the advisory boards, including the statutorily mandated Consumer 
Advisory Board (CAB), one of Mr. Mulvaney’s political appointees, Anthony Welcher, 
stated that “the RFIs was [sic] a big driver for [the] process”10 of shutting down the 
advisory boards. When a CAB member asked for more information about the RFI 
responses that recommended dismissing the advisory boards, Mr. Welcher admitted that 
“no comments were made about dissolving [the advisory boards]. . . . The RFI process 
allowed—there were comments that had been submitted along the way, and then in the 
final review, nothing changed from the direction we were headed.”11 In sum, the CFPB 
                                                
9  Inherited Regulations RFI, supra note 2, at 12,882. 
10  6.6.18 11am Advisory Boards and Councils Recorded Call (available from the CFPB). 
11  Id. The termination of the CAB also prevented the CFPB from hearing about emerging problems 
in consumer financial markets, which is one of the duties of the CAB. By silencing the CAB, the political 
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did not tell the truth when saying that the leadership relied on the RFI responses in 
terminating the advisory boards. And, the CFPB had planned the terminations before the 
RFI response period had ended.  
 
Meanwhile, Mr. Mulvaney moved to commandeer or dismantle other core functions of 
the Bureau before the RFI responses on those functions were even due.  For instance, on 
May 9, 2018, he announced that he was creating a new Office of Cost-Benefit Analysis 
that would be housed within the director’s office.12  He made that announcement even 
though the RFI on Bureau rulemaking processes seeking public comments on that exact 
topic was still open and did not close for another month.   
 
On April 24, 2018, Mr. Mulvaney announced plans to shutter the CFPB’s consumer 
complaint database13 even though the RFI on that topic did not close for public comment 
until June 4.   
 
Lastly, as we discuss in the next section, the CFPB’s Adopted Regulations RFI and 
Inherited Regulations RFI were equally vague and sweeping, raising concerns that both 
RFIs are smokescreens for existing plans by the Acting Director to reverse landmark 
CFPB rules protecting consumers.  
 
These events revealed that: 
 
1. even when not telling the truth, one of Mr. Mulvaney’s chosen staff pointed to 
the RFI responses to support his position, which reflects just how important 
the RFI responses are for bolstering the CFPB’s positions;  
2. the CFPB leadership is willing to mislead members of the CAB and the larger 
public to stifle public input through its advisory boards; 
3. the CFPB has given the public the impression that it will make critical 
decisions about its activities based on public input through the RFI process 
when, in fact, the CFPB has already made at least some decisions on topics 
related to the RFIs before the deadlines for the public responses to RFIs; and 
4. although it is a public agency, the CFPB does not care what the American 
people think or want. 
 
III. This RFI impedes public input by being impossibly vague and broad 
 
                                                                                                                                            
appointees at the CFPB have eliminated a significant vehicle for the staff to learn of such wrongdoing.  12 
U.S.C.A. 1014.  
 
12  Memorandum from Mick Mulvaney to DL DFPB All Hands, A Note on Staffing and Bureau 
Organization, (May 9, 2018), https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/4454936-CFPB-Memo.html 
(viewed May 22, 2018); Evan Weinberger, Mulvaney Brings More Political Oversight in CFPB 
Restructuring, BLOOMBERG LAW BANKING DAILY, May 9, 2018. 
13  See Remarks by Mick Mulvaney, Acting Director, Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, April 
24, 2018, American Bankers Association Annual Conference, Washington, D.C., at 5 (available at 
https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/4446622-Transcript-Mulvaney-ABA-Conference-4-24-
2018.html) (viewed May 3, 2018) [hereinafter April 24, 2018 Remarks]. 
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The inherited rules RFI impedes consumer input by being impossibly vague and 
impossibly broad. The Inherited Regulations RFI “seeks public input regarding the 
substance of the Inherited Regulations, including whether the Bureau should issue 
additional rules. . . .The Bureau is seeking feedback on all aspects of the inherited 
regulations.”14 It then asks for suggestions for updates or modifications to the rules, and 
any aspects of the Inherited Regulations that should not be modified. The substantive 
portion of the RFI is 5 pages long. Nowhere does the RFI state the specific provisions the 
Bureau is considering revising. Similarly, the RFI does not specify any regulations that 
the Bureau is contemplating adopting.  
 
For obvious reasons, the standard practice is for RFIs to ask very specific questions. For 
example, the substantive portion of the RFI seeking input on Payday Loans, Vehicle Title 
Loans, Installment Loans and Open End Lines of Credit,15 was 34 pages long and 
included background information and numerous detailed questions.16 The very first 
question reflects the approach of the standard CFPB RFI:  
 
Is there a viable business model in extending high-cost, non-covered loans 
for terms longer than 45 days without regard to the borrower’s ability to 
repay the loan as scheduled? If so, what are the essential characteristics of 
this business model or models and what consumer protection concerns, if 
any, are associated with such practices?17 
 
Vagueness is not the only problem with the Inherited Regulations and other rule-related 
RFIs. The breadth of the regulations covered by this RFI is astounding. Unlike the 
payday lending RFI discussed above, the Inherited Regulations RFI covers twenty sets of 
rules, each of which has many components. To give a sense of the scope of the Inherited 
Regulations RFI, we have listed the parts of just one of the many regulations that fall 
within the RFI:18 
 
PART 226—TRUTH IN LENDING (REGULATION Z) 
 
Subpart A—GENERAL 
 
§226.1 
 
Authority, purpose, coverage, organization, enforcement, and liability. 
 
§226.2 
 
Definitions and rules of construction. 
 
                                                
14   Inherited Regulations RFI, supra note 2, at 12,882-83. 
15  Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, Request for Information on Payday Loans, Vehicle Title 
Loans, Installment Loans and Open End Lines of Credit  (June 1, 2016) (available at 
https://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/documents/RFI_Payday_Loans_Vehicle_Title_Loans_Installment_Loa
ns_Open-End_Credit.pdf). 
16 Id. 
17  Id. at 17. 
18  12 C.F.R. pt. 1026. Regulation Z was issued pursuant to the Truth in Lending Act, 15 U.S.C.A. 
1601 et seq. 
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§226.3 
 
Exempt transactions. 
 
§226.4 
 
Finance charge. 
 
 
Subpart B—OPEN-END CREDIT 
 
§226.5 
 
General disclosure requirements. 
 
§226.5a 
 
Credit and charge card applications and solicitations. 
 
§226.5b 
 
Requirements for home equity plans. 
 
§226.6 
 
Account-opening disclosures. 
 
§226.7 
 
Periodic statement. 
 
§226.8 
 
Identifying transactions on periodic statements. 
 
§226.9 
 
Subsequent disclosure requirements. 
 
§226.10 
 
Payments. 
 
§226.11 
 
Treatment of credit balances; account termination. 
 
§226.12 
 
Special credit card provisions. 
 
§226.13 
 
Billing error resolution. 
 
§226.14 
 
Determination of annual percentage rate. 
 
§226.15 
 
Right of rescission. 
 
§226.16 
 
Advertising. 
 
 
Subpart C—CLOSED-END CREDIT 
 
§226.17 
 
General disclosure requirements. 
 
§226.18 
 
Content of disclosures. 
 
§226.19 
 
Certain mortgage and variable-rate transactions. 
 
§226.20 
 
Subsequent disclosure requirements. 
 
§226.21 
 
Treatment of credit balances. 
 
§226.22 
 
Determination of annual percentage rate. 
 
§226.23 
 
Right of rescission. 
 
§226.24 
 
Advertising. 
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Subpart D—MISCELLANEOUS 
 
§226.25 
 
Record retention. 
 
§226.26 
 
Use of annual percentage rate in oral disclosures. 
 
§226.27 
 
Language of disclosures. 
 
§226.28 
 
Effect on State laws. 
 
§226.29 
 
State exemptions. 
 
§226.30 
 
Limitation on rates. 
 
 
Subpart E—SPECIAL RULES FOR CERTAIN HOME MORTGAGE TRANSACTIONS 
 
§226.31 
 
General rules. 
 
§226.32 
 
Requirements for certain closed-end home mortgages. 
 
§226.33 
 
Requirements for reverse mortgages. 
 
§226.34 
 
Prohibited acts or practices in connection with credit subject to §226.32. 
 
§226.35 
 
Prohibited acts or practices in connection with higher-priced mortgage 
loans. 
 
§226.36 
 
Prohibited acts or practices in connection with credit secured by a 
dwelling. 
 
§§226.37-226.38 
 
[Reserved] 
 
§226.39 
 
Mortgage transfer disclosures. 
 
§§226.40-226.41 
 
[Reserved] 
 
§226.42 
 
Valuation independence. 
 
§226.43 
 
Appraisals for higher-priced mortgage loans. 
 
§§226.44-226.45 
 
[Reserved] 
 
 
Subpart F—SPECIAL RULES FOR PRIVATE EDUCATION LOANS 
 
§226.46 
 
Special disclosure requirements for private education loans. 
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§226.47 
 
Content of disclosures. 
 
§226.48 
 
Limitations on private education loans. 
 
 
Subpart G—SPECIAL RULES APPLICABLE TO CREDIT CARD ACCOUNTS AND OPEN-END 
CREDIT OFFERED TO COLLEGE STUDENTS 
 
§226.51 
 
Ability to Pay. 
 
§226.52 
 
Limitations on fees. 
 
§226.53 
 
Allocation of payments. 
 
§226.54 
 
Limitations on the imposition of finance charges. 
 
§226.55 
 
Limitations on increasing annual percentage rates, fees, and charges. 
 
§226.56 
 
Requirements for over-the-limit transactions. 
 
§226.57 
 
Reporting and marketing rules for college student open-end credit. 
 
§226.58 
 
Internet posting of credit card agreements. 
 
§226.59 
 
Reevaluation of rate increases. 
 
 
  Appendix                         Appendix A to Part 226--Effect on State Laws 
Appendix 
 
Appendix B to Part 226—State Exemptions 
 
Appendix 
 
Appendix C to Part 226—Issuance of Staff Interpretations 
 
Appendix 
 
Appendix D to Part 226—Multiple Advance Construction Loans 
 
Appendix 
 
Appendix E to Part 226—Rules for Card Issuers That Bill on a 
Transaction-by-Transaction Basis 
 
Appendix 
 
Appendix F to Part 226—Optional Annual Percentage Rate 
Computations for Creditors Offering Open-End Plans Subject to the 
Requirements of §226.5b 
 
Appendix 
 
Appendix G to Part 226—Open-End Model Forms and Clauses 
 
Appendix 
 
Appendix H to Part 226— Closed-End Model Forms and Clauses 
 
Appendix 
 
Appendix I to Part 226—Federal Enforcement Agencies 
 
Appendix 
 
Appendix J to Part 226—Annual Percentage Rate Computations for 
Closed-End Credit Transactions 
 
Appendix 
 
Appendix K to Part 226—Total Annual Loan Cost Rate Computations 
for Reverse Mortgage Transactions 
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Appendix 
 
Appendix L to Part 226—Assumed Loan Periods for Computations of 
Total Annual Loan Cost Rates 
 
Appendix 
 
Appendix M1 to Part 226—Repayment Disclosures 
 
Appendix 
 
Appendix M2 to Part 226—Sample Calculations of Repayment 
Disclosures 
 
Appendix 
 
Appendix N to Part 226—Higher-Priced Mortgage Loan Appraisal Safe 
Harbor Review 
 
Appendix 
 
Appendix O to Part 226—Illustrative Written Source Documents for 
Higher-Priced Mortgage Loan Appraisal Rules 
 
Appendix 
 
Supplement I to Part 226—Official Staff Interpretations 
 
 
 
The vagueness and breadth of the Inherited Regulations RFI makes it impossible for any 
stakeholders to meaningfully respond unless, that is, they already know the changes that 
the Bureau is considering. Responses to FOIA requests reveal that Mr. Mulvaney and his 
political appointees have been meeting regularly with representatives from financial 
services and related industries. The CFPB has kept many of these meetings and their 
contents secret. The closed-door meetings, coupled with Mr. Mulvaney’s express 
commitment19 to put business concerns ahead of consumers’ financial welfare, lead to the 
ready conclusion that the meetings enable the Bureau to tell industry which rule changes 
it is contemplating.  By the same token, these secret meetings give industry an 
opportunity to tell the Bureau what changes it hopes it will make to benefit companies 
subject to CFPB oversight. 
 
The cozy relationship between the CFPB and financial firms gives industry 
representatives a tremendous advantage because they can craft their RFI responses to 
address the changes the CFPB anticipates making. They can also recommend any 
changes that were well received by the CFPB during the meetings with Mr. Mulvaney 
and his political appointees.  
 
Consumers and advocates are in the dark, attempting to address issues that are hidden 
from their view and pleading their cases to an Acting Director who is allied with industry 
and who has made it clear that he wants to reduce the consumer protection regulations 
under which financial firms must operate. In sum, the CFPB’s RFI practices handicap 
consumers and American families and privilege the representatives from financial 
services industry. The RFI process that should be and looks to be transparent has actually 
become the opposite.  
 
The CFPB has engaged in the same short-circuiting of public feedback by imposing very 
short deadlines to respond. The response time is 90 days, which is about the same amount 
                                                
19  See April 24, 2018 Remarks, supra note 13, at 5; Rachel Witkowski, Mulvaney vows to ‘bring 
sanity’ to Qualified Mortgage rule, AM. BANKER, May 15, 2018.   
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of time that was given for people to comment on the very narrow topic of payday lending 
regulation discussed above.  
 
The unworkable RFIs, tight deadlines, and the mischaracterization of the RFI responses 
demonstrate that the CFPB’s RFI process is a mockery and illegitimate. 
 
IV. The CFPB is Disguising what Should have been Notice and Comment 
Rulemaking as Requests for Information  
  
The CFPB has stated that the rule-related RFIs are for the purpose of obtaining 
information on desired changes to existing rules and recommendations for new rules. 
This type of inquiry falls under the Administrative Procedure Act, which requires very 
specific steps in the “process for formulating, amending, or repealing a rule.”20 
 
Specifically, if the CFPB is contemplating a new rule, or an amendment or repeal of an 
existing rule, it must: 
  
• publish a notice of proposed rulemaking in the Federal Register; 
• provide the public with information about the rulemaking proceedings, 
including the governing legal authority for the rulemaking; and 
• specify “either the terms or substance of the proposed rule or a description of 
the subjects and issues involved.”21 
  
In addition, during notice-and-comment rulemaking, people outside the CFPB are 
prohibited from having ex parte communications with “any decision-making personnel 
that imparts information or argument directed to the merits or outcome of a rulemaking 
proceeding.”22  In its rulemaking RFIs, the CFPB appears to be doing all the things you 
would expect to see in a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, but without giving adequate 
notice or following proper procedures. Of equal importance, the CFPB cannot escape its 
own prohibition on ex parte communications by mischaracterizing proposed rulemakings 
as requests for information. 
 
V. If the CFPB’s Illegitimate RFI Process is Successful, the Financial Security of 
Consumers, Hardworking American Families, and Financial Markets will be 
in Jeopardy   
 
                                                
20  Id. at 1. 
21  5 U.S.C.A. 553(b)(1-3) 
22  Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, Policy on Ex Parte Presentations in Rulemaking 
Proceedings, 82 Fed. Reg. 12,687, 18,689 (April 21, 2017). 
 
 The CFPB will consider ex parte communications if specific requirements are met: “A person who 
makes an oral ex parte presentation shall . . . submit to the CFPB’s Executive Secretary and the CFPB 
employee point of contact for the presentation, a memorandum summarizing the presentation.” Id. at 
18,689-90.  Any person making ex parte written communications must likewise submit the presentation to 
the same entities. The CFPB then posts the submissions to the public rulemaking docket. Id.         
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The points we make here are not simply to contest the RFI process. They are about 
history. Prior to the financial crisis, the Office of Thrift Supervision and the Office of the 
Comptroller of the Currency were captured by the financial services industry. In addition, 
the one regulator that could have imposed market-wide discipline on the lending 
industry—the Federal Reserve – refused to exercise its Congressional mandate to protect 
consumers. When Congress created the CFPB, it was in response to industry capture and 
the unwillingness of the Federal Reserve to curtail abusive lending. Now, the current 
administration of the CFPB is mimicking the past federal bank regulators, which is sure 
to again harm the American people. 
 
 
 
